回复Natalja。
是肯定的–一种很深很深的紧张感!我相信泛神论者通常把上帝和世界等同起来，所以亚历山大做了一件更奇怪的事，把上帝放在世界里(即世界没有被上帝耗尽)。
Although less fun than a traditional conference I suspect I understood more.
Thank you too to all my fellow participants.
Peter
好的，谢谢。对我来说，这似乎是标准的现实主义，我认为它必须留下一个解释性的要求(即在这种情况下，解释性的要求涉及到令牌如何改变其真值的问题，即是什么不是令牌时间的一部分，令牌的真值取决于它的时间)。那东西，不管它是什么，看起来都不像它是现实的一部分(正如你所说的，一个块)。
在回复https://blogs.开云体育app客服kent.ac.uk/growingblock/deng/#comment-150 回复Natalja。< / p > A shrivelled past involves a (back) block in which there aren’t, tenselessly, things much like there are at the ‘present’ time, but very exotic hitherto unencountered things, and not tenselessly but in some for me hard to understand present past way. On my view, the things in the past are exactly the things we have encountered already. But I can’t make sense of what it is for them to be like anything other than what they are like when present. I can only understand what things are like when present because everything I’ve ever experience was present when experienced. Similarly I can’t describe what red things look like in the dark. They don’t look like anything, because I can only see colour when there is some light. Just as I think my sofa is still red when I turn the lights off (even though I can’t see it) I think think the past still exists when it ceases to be present. I have a story to tell about why the present is special – it is the time where actiality and potentiality meet. So I find it tough to make sense of how things are meant to be on a static Block view, because there is no room for potentiality to meet actuality. There is just how things are. I find making sense of the static Block really baffling, just as if you said that you wanted me to imagine a load of brightly coloured things, but without imagining any light source.
回复Natalja。< / p >
So, there are a whole range of times that exist, the latest ones are in August 2015, and there are lots and lots earlier than that.
If we are saying that there exists a token, at some time, then I’m not sure what it means for us to say that the token is at some other time with a different truth-value (it sounds like we aretalking about a different token). There is just the token, and it has what truth-value it has.
However, the Universe changes as time passes (indeed this change is constitutive of time passing).
So the token (the very same one) can change truth-value, (without any intrinsic change to the token). This is because the truth-value of the token might depend on things that are not part of the time the token is tokened. (Recall my example above: ‘Queen Victoria is (tenselessly) the longest reigning British Monarch ever’ depends on whether there exists one who has reigned for longer).
I’m happy talking about how things will go in the future – the laws of nature allow me to know what events will happen, and, indeed, that more events will happen. The laws of nature are likewise useful in explaining that in the past fewer things had happened. But a commitment to hyper-times would involve me thinking there exists some (hyper)time at which a different Growing-Block stage exists. But in my ontology I just have this Growing-Block stage.
I see the worry — It is David’s worry that I am committed to ‘reality pointing beyond itself’. But I think temporal reality can point beyond itself without my being ontologically committed to different growing block stages, just as I think I can be committed to reality modally pointing beyond itself without thinking that I’m ontologically committed to merely possible worlds.
同意(:))。所以我可以问格雷姆，你不同意‘在一个时间存在的令牌在另一个时间(同一时间维度)是否为真’是没有意义的吗?我想这可以归结为整个现实的变化(从而影响到代币的真值变化，如果确实如此)。我将仔细研究你的论文，以便更好地理解你是如何思考这个问题的。
回复Kristie。
非常感谢，克里斯蒂!我喜欢这张报纸!< / p >